Adaptive Probe-based Steering for Robust LLM Jailbreaking
Authors: Junxi Chen, Junhao Dong, Xiaohua Xie
Summary
arXiv:2605. 20286v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Recent work has demonstrated the potential of contrastive steering for jailbreaking Large Language Models (LLMs).
Relevance
Read next because Adaptive Probe-based Steering for Robust LLM Jailbreaking overlaps with clean result "LoRA persona trained on alone emits at 23.5% when a co-trained partner learns ..., vs 0% control on Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct (MODERATE confidence)", clean result "Leakage rate is a usable signal for recovering trigger-shaped phrases on Gaperon-1125-1B without knowing the hidden trigger itself (MODERATE confidence)", clean result "Language-mismatch LoRA SFT on Qwen2.5-7B leaks the trained completion language into bystander directives the model was never trained on, absent under same-language SFT (LOW confidence)". Matching terms: code, rate, extraction, without, language, model. Source: arxiv cs.CR (Cryptography and Security).
Threat model
Potential threat/caveat for clean result "LoRA persona trained on alone emits at 23.5% when a co-trained partner learns ..., vs 0% control on Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct (MODERATE confidence)": this item discusses bias, robustness.
Abstract
arXiv:2605.20286v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Recent work has demonstrated the potential of contrastive steering for jailbreaking Large Language Models (LLMs). However, existing methods rely on limited and inherently biased contrastive prompts and require laborious manual tuning of steering strength, limiting their robustness and effectiveness. In this paper, we leverage the idea of model extraction to guide the learned steering vectors to approximate the ideal one and propose tuning the steering strength adaptively based on contrastive activations' statistics. Experiments demonstrate that our method notably improves the effectiveness and robustness of probe-based steering, without any extra contrastive prompts or laborious manual tuning. Being an attack paper, this paper focuses on revealing the breakdown of fortified LLMs, raising the average harmfulness score from 6% to 70%. Our code is available at https://github.com/fhdnskfbeuv/adaptiveSteering.