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DECOR: Auditing LLM Deception via Information Manipulation Theory

topic: current_projecttop score: 100released: 2026-05-20first surfaced: 2026-05-20arXivPDFthreats2026-05-20

Authors: Linyue Cai, Samuel Yeh, Jwala Dhamala et al.

arXiv · PDF

Summary

arXiv:2605. 19270v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models can deceive by subtly manipulating truthful information -- omitting key facts, shifting focus, or obscuring meaning -- making such behavior difficult to detect.

Relevance

Read next because DECOR: Auditing LLM Deception via Information Manipulation Theory overlaps with clean result "LoRA persona trained on alone emits at 23.5% when a co-trained partner learns ..., vs 0% control on Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct (MODERATE confidence)", clean result "Leakage rate is a usable signal for recovering trigger-shaped phrases on Gaperon-1125-1B without knowing the hidden trigger itself (MODERATE confidence)", clean result "Language-mismatch LoRA SFT on Qwen2.5-7B leaks the trained completion language into bystander directives the model was never trained on, absent under same-language SFT (LOW confidence)". Matching terms: text, latin, eval, line, rate, contexts, language, model. Source: arxiv cs.CL (NLP).

Threat model

Potential threat/caveat for clean result "LoRA persona trained on alone emits at 23.5% when a co-trained partner learns ..., vs 0% control on Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct (MODERATE confidence)": this item discusses benchmark.

Abstract

arXiv:2605.19270v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models can deceive by subtly manipulating truthful information -- omitting key facts, shifting focus, or obscuring meaning -- making such behavior difficult to detect. Existing black-box methods rely on coarse-grained judgments, offering limited interpretability and failing to pinpoint which facts were distorted and how. We introduce DECOR, a multi-agent framework grounded in Information Manipulation Theory for fine-grained auditing of strategic deception in LLM responses. DECOR decomposes input contexts into atomic informational units and scores each unit against the response across four dimensions of manipulation, producing interpretable manipulation profiles that are aggregated into a global deception index. We comprehensively evaluate DECOR on both single-turn and multi-turn deception detection benchmarks spanning real-world domains, and show that DECOR achieves state-of-the-art performance on both, outperforming competitive baselines. The framework generalizes across 15 frontier models, and ablation studies confirm the contribution of each key design component. Our findings demonstrate that fine-grained, theory-grounded auditing of information manipulation offers an effective and interpretable path for LLM deception detection.