Beyond Controlled Noise: Achieving Symmetric FHE through Dynamic Position Shifting
Authors: Mostefa Kara
Summary
arXiv:2605. 15774v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Traditional Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) schemes often suffer from prohibitive computational overhead and complex noise management.
Relevance
Read next because Beyond Controlled Noise: Achieving Symmetric FHE through Dynamic Position Shifting overlaps with clean result "LoRA persona trained on alone emits at 23.5% when a co-trained partner learns ..., vs 0% control on Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct (MODERATE confidence)", clean result "Leakage rate is a usable signal for recovering trigger-shaped phrases on Gaperon-1125-1B without knowing the hidden trigger itself (MODERATE confidence)", clean result "Language-mismatch LoRA SFT on Qwen2.5-7B leaks the trained completion language into bystander directives the model was never trained on, absent under same-language SFT (LOW confidence)". Matching terms: text, rect, control, binding, full, position. Source: arxiv cs.CR (Cryptography and Security).
Abstract
arXiv:2605.15774v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Traditional Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) schemes often suffer from prohibitive computational overhead and complex noise management. In this paper, we propose a novel symmetric FHE through a mechanism of plaintext fragmentation and dynamic interposition. Our approach is built upon a modular encryption foundation, c = mk + rp, which is naturally additive but typically limited by exponential noise growth during multiplication. To resolve this, we introduce an interposition framework where the plaintext is partitioned into multiple fragments across distinct logical positions. We introduce a dual-regulator system to govern the multiplication process; exponent regulators (t_i) redirect the product of fragments to a new target position, preventing the accumulation of secret key exponents, while coefficient regulators (d_i) normalize the resulting scalars. Security is established through a binding mechanism where exponents and coefficients are mutually dependent, shielding the secret key k from algebraic manipulation and substitution attacks.